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Abstract
Leverage is strongly related to liquidity in a market and lack of liquidity
is considered a cause and/or consequence of the recent financial crisis. A
repurchase agreement is a financial instrument where a security is sold si-
multaneously with an agreement to buy it back at a later date. Repurchase
agreements (repos) market size is a very important element in calculating the
overall leverage in a financial market. Therefore, studying the behavior of
repos market size can help to understand a process that can contribute to the
birth of a financial crisis. We hypothesize that herding behavior among large
investors led to massive over-leveraging through the use of repos, resulting
in a bubble (built up over the previous years) and subsequent crash in this
market in early 2008. We use the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model of
rational expectation bubbles and behavioral finance to study the dynamics
of the repo market that led to the crash. The JLS model qualifies a bub-
ble by the presence of characteristic patterns in the price dynamics, called
log-periodic power law (LPPL) behavior. We show that there was significant
LPPL behavior in the market before that crash and that the predicted range
of times predicted by the model for the end of the bubble is consistent with
the observations.
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1. Introduction
Financial bubbles play a huge role in the global economy, affecting hun-
dreds of millions of people yet, until recently, the existence of such bubbles,
much less their effects, have been ignored at the policy level. Finally, only
after this most recent historical global financial crisis (which is still ongoing),
officials at the highest level of government and academic finance have ac-
knowledged the existence and importance of identifying and understanding
bubbles. No less than the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, William C. Dudley, stated just a few months ago [1]:
. . .what I am proposing is that we try—try to identify bubbles
in real time, try to develop tools to address those bubbles, try to
use those tools when appropriate to limit the size of those bubbles
and, therefore, try to limit the damage when those bubbles burst.
Such a statement from the New York Fed—representing, essentially, the mon-
etary policy of the United States governmental banking system—would have
been, and, in some circles, still is, unheard of. This, in short, is a bombshell
and a wake-up call to academics and practitioners. Dudley proposes to “try
to develop tools to address...bubbles”. Before discussing tools that could
address bubbles, we must know what a bubble is.
A financial bubble is a curious beast: its meaning is accepted as beyond
obvious by average people yet its very existence is loudly debated in angry
terms among experts. Arguably, almost any given adult met on the street in,
say Asia, Europe or North America (and, or course, elsewhere), would know
exactly what one is and could cite examples in recent and distant history.
The dot.com bubble ending in 2000 and the housing bubble recently ended
would most likely be the most common examples given. More well-read—
but still non-expert—people could cite the Dutch tulip mania in the 1600s
and the South Sea Company of the 1700s. After that, the examples are less
well-known but not because of their scarcity but just because most people
are not interested in financial history and debates. This is changing.
While the general population accepts bubbles, academics and policy-
makers have a decades-old tradition of arguing about whether bubbles even
exist. This single fact could very well be the most striking and unbelievable
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statement ever transmitted from the Ivory Tower. In spite of the lack of aca-
demic consensus on a definition, we can give a qualitative ideas of bubbles
and apply our quantitative approach in the next sections. Following [2], the
term “bubble” refers to a situation in which excessive public expectations of
future price increases cause prices to be temporarily elevated. For instance,
during a housing price bubble, homebuyers think that a home that they
would normally consider too expensive for them is now an acceptable pur-
chase because they will be compensated by significant further price increases.
They will not need to save as much as they otherwise might, because they
expect the increased value of their home to do the saving for them. First-
time homebuyers may also worry during a housing bubble that if they do
not buy now, they will not be able to afford a home later. Furthermore, the
expectation of large price increases may have a strong impact on demand
if people think that home prices are very unlikely to fall, and certainly not
likely to fall for long, so that there is little perceived risk associated with an
investment in a home.
In this paper, instead of a housing bubble, we argue that there was a
leverage bubble that peaked and crashed in early 2008 after building up for
the years beforehand. As we explain below, the leverage bubble formed and
grew for the same reasons as described in the housing bubble example above:
investors were afraid that if they did not extend their leverage (buy a house)
then they would lose money later. Further, we argue that the size of the
market in repurchase agreements (or repos, for short) is an observable proxy
of leverage in the financial system. We will elaborate on repos below, but,
briefly, a repo is simply a cash transaction for an asset combined with a for-
ward contract to buy the asset back at a later time (hence ‘re-purchase’). By
measuring the size of the repos market and applying an appropriate bubble
model, we can see that the leverage crash in early 2008 was potentially a
forecastable event.
The paper is constructed as follows: in Section 2, we discuss the relation-
ship between repos market size and the overall leverage of the market. In
Section 3, we briefly introduce the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette model [3, 4] of
bubbles and apply it to total repos market size to make an ex-post forecast
of the crash in early 2008. We conclude in Section 4.
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2. Repos market size represents the leverage of the market
A repurchase agreement (repo) is the sale of securities together with an
agreement for the seller to buy back the securities at a later date [5]. In
other words, it is a contract obliging the seller of an asset to buy back the
asset at a specified price on a given date. Therefore, a repo is equivalent to
a cash transaction combined with a forward contract. The cash transaction
results in transfer of money to the borrower in exchange for legal transfer of
the security to the lender, while the forward contract ensures repayment of
the loan to the lender and return of the collateral of the borrower.
To understand the possible role of repos in the generation of a bubble,
we first discuss the relationship between leverage and balance sheet size. We
start with a very simple case, taken from Section 2 of [6]. Assume that an
investment bank has 100 USD in securities while its shareholder equity is 20
USD and its debt is 80 USD. Then the balance sheet of this bank looks like:
Assets Liabilities
Securities, 100 Equity, 20
Debt, 80
Now the leverage of the bank is:
assets
equity
=
100
20
= 5. (1)
Suppose that the debts of this bank are all long term debts and, therefore,
we can assume that the debt remains the same in the balance sheet over the
short period of time considered in the argument. Now assume that the prices
of the securities increase by 10%, so that the new balance sheet is:
Assets Liabilities
Securities, 110 Equity, 30
Debt, 80
The leverage, then, becomes:
assets
equity
=
110
30
= 3.67 < 5. (2)
This shows that the leverage decreases as the assets’ prices increase.
However, to an investor during the bull market, reduction of the leverage
means losing money. Consider another example to demonstrate this. Suppose
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that two people A and B both have a house worth 1000 USD. Assume that
they somehow know that the price of gold, for instance, will definitely increase
in the near future. Each of them can use her house as collateral and get a
maximum 2000 USD load from a bank (based on the recent convention of
poor underwriting requirements). Investor A, being somewhat unsure of
her future ability to repay her debts, applied for and received ‘only’ 1500
USD, which corresponds to a leverage of 1.5. Investor B, though, with no
such qualms, asked for and received the maximum value of 2000 USD, for a
leverage of 2. Both investors used all of the borrowed money to buy gold.
After one month, the gold price, as expected, increased by 20%. Both A and
B sold all of the leveraged gold and repurchased their respective houses for
1000 USD (ignore interest rate for simplicity). Investor A has made a profit
of 800 USD but investor B, the bold risk-taker, has made almost double the
profit of 1400 USD by simply increasing her leverage by one-third. In a sense,
investor A’s weak-kneed approach lost 600 USD due to failure to maximally
leverage her position.
With this lesson in mind, let us now return to the investment bank.
During the bull market, banks believe that the markets will continue to
increase and that all of their competitors will be maximally leveraged to take
advantage of the expected rise. If a bank decreases its leverage, it means
it will lose money in the future so, guided by the practice of maximizing
short-term profits by any means necessary, banks increase their leverage in
order to get more return in the future. How large they will increase their
leverage depends on their expectation of the future market. If the market
performs very well now, they expect that the future will be very good, also.
This means that they will change their leverage based on the return now.
Regardless of whether this is a good thing or not, for our study, we can use
this because it implies that the total asset growth should be proportional to
the leverage growth. This is demonstrated in Fig. 8 of [6]. In that paper,
the authors used quarterly data from more than 10 years for six major U.S.
investment banks: Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear
Stearns, Goldman Sachs and Citigroup Markets. The total asset growth of
the banks is found strongly proportional to the leverage growth. So we know
that when the expectation of the market is high, the investment banks tend
to increase their leverage. The next question, then, is: how can a bank
change its leverage?
Repos play a key role here. A typical balance sheet of an investment bank
has not only the long term debt but also repos. Therefore, a typical balance
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sheet is as follows:
Assets Liabilities
Trading assets Repos
Reverse repos Long term debt
Other assets Equity
Recall that a repo is the sale of securities together with an agreement for the
seller to buy back the securities at a later date. Long term debt is normally
a small fraction of the balance sheet and can be assumed to be constant over
the time scale of interest here (a few years at most). In this case, when banks
want to increase or decrease their leverage, they will write repos.
One may argue that the haircut of the repo1 is also a very important role
for the leverage of the banks. We completely agree with this and the re-
purchase haircut should be counted here. However, the historical data shows
that the haircut remains approximately within a range between 10% and 20%
during ‘normal’ (i.e., non-crisis) times. During a financial crisis, the haircut
will rise sharply to a very high level. When there is a shortage of liquidity,
for instance, during the recent financial crisis, investors are afraid to trade.
Increased haircuts and decreased repos size usually occur simultaneously. In
this paper, we want to investigate the question of whether or not the dynam-
ics of repos activity shows any precursory information before a large crash.
Of course, this means we only use data before a crash to try to estimate the
time of its onset. Since the haircut is almost constant for a long time before
a crash, all of the leverage information lies in the repo size of the market.
To summarize this section, we claim that:
1. investors want to increase their leverage when their expectations of
future gains of the market increase;
2. they will use repos to increase their leverage;
3. therefore, the total repo market size is a proxy to measure the overall
expectation of all investors.
1The “haircut is the difference between the true market value of the collateral and that
used by the dealers in the repo contract. This haircut reflects the underlying risk of the
collateral and protects the buyer against a change in its value. Haircuts are therefore
specific to classes of collateral.
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3. Predicting financial crashes with the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette
model
In the last section, we said that the repos market size represents the
average leverage of the market and the leverage represents the investors’
expectation of future market returns. We now discuss how the dynamics of
leverage among traders could lead to a bubble and how this bubble can be
identified as it grows.
We have argued before that bubbles are the result of imitation and herding
behavior among investors [7, 3, 4, 8]. In the current case, investors increase
their leverage when they see others doing so because, as discussed above,
they think that they will lose money if they are the only ones not taking this
strategy. Of course, this is a self-reinforcing (positive feedback) process: the
numbers of leveraged investors and their levels of leverage will increase in a
game of financial copycat. At some point, though, some investors are bound
to notice that the numbers are too large and they will start to deleverage.
Others nervously waiting for this signal will unload as well and the bottom
will drop out. When this occurs, the repo market size goes down dramatically
and the haircut of the repo increases very sharply, both leading to rapid loss
of liquidity in the repo market.
This qualitative process is quantified in the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette
(JLS) model to describe the herding dynamics during a bubble [3, 4]. This
model combines the economic theory of rational expectation bubbles, be-
havioral finance on imitation and herding of investors and traders and the
mathematical and statistical physics of bifurcations and phase transitions.
Many successful predictions of financial market crashes based on this model
have been made, such as the 2006–2008 oil bubble [9], the Chinese index bub-
ble in 2009 [10], real estate market in Las Vegas [11], South African stock
market bubble [12]. Also, new methods using this model to predict stock
market rebounds rather than the crashes are being developed [13].
In the JLS model, (the logarithm of) price is used as a proxy for herding
behavior among traders (see [14] for justifications on the use of log-price
versus price). Since we argue that the repo market size is also a proxy for
herding via the leverage level, we substitute it for the log-price in the JLS
model. For the total repos market size R(t) at time t, we use the following
JLS model specification (corresponding to replace log-price by repos volume
in the JLS equation):
R(t) = A+B|tc − t|
m + C|tc − t|
m cos(lnω|tc − t|+ φ) , (3)
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where tc is the crash time and m,ω, φ, A,B and C are parameters. To de-
termine the values of these parameters, we want to minimize the sum of
squares:
(tc, m, ω, φ, A,B, C) = (4)
argmin
∑
t
(R(t)− A+B|tc − t|
m + C|tc − t|
m cos(lnω|tc − t| + φ))
2 .
We hypothesize that the run-up to the sudden large drop in the repos market
in early 2008 was characterized by LPPL dynamics, supporting our claim of
the entanglement of expectations, leverage and herding behavior.
To test this hypothesis, we use the weekly data of US primary dealers’
total repos size from 6 July 1994 to 23 June 2010.23 The data have very
strong seasonal effects due to the fact that banks try to remove their repos
to improve their balance sheet at the end of each quarter. To remove the
seasonal effect, we used a 13 week (1 quarter) moving average.
We fit this smoothed time series with the JLS equation (3) in time win-
dows defined by (t1, t2). We chose a fixed t2 = 13 February 2008, approxi-
mately one month before the observed peak of the repos volume. We then
repeated the analysis with an ensemble of 7 values of t2, each separated by
7 days for the 3 weeks before and after 13 February 2008. Note that the 7
values of t2 bracket a time span of 6 weeks, with the end of that period (5
March 2008) being just before the large drop in the repos market. Also note
that an observer in the past on this date would not have noticed any unusual
drop in the time series. That is, the impending crash was not obvious based
on any recent trend in the data (though perhaps some market intelligence
could have provided an indication). For each value of t2, we use an ensemble
of different t1’s. Each ensemble brackets a range between 6 and 18 months
before the respective t2 and values of t1 are separated by 7 days.
The fit for a particular (t1, t2) interval is generated in two steps. First,
2We thank Tobias Adrian from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for providing
the data.
3The primary dealers list: BNP Paribas Securities Corp, Banc of America Securities
LLC Barclays Capital Inc, Cantor Fitzgerald & Co, Citigroup Global Markets Inc, Credit
Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Daiwa Capital Markets America Inc, Deutsche Bank Securi-
ties Inc, Goldman, Sachs & Co, HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, Jefferies & Company, Inc, J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC, Mizuho Securities USA Inc, Morgan Stanley & Co, Incorporated
Nomura Securities International, Inc, RBC Capital Markets Corporation RBS Securities
Inc, UBS Securities LLC.
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the linear parameters A,B and C are slaved to the non-linear parameters by
solving them analytically as a function of the nonlinear parameters. We refer
to [3] (page 238 and following ones), which gives the detailed equations and
procedure. Then, the search space is obtained as a 4 dimensional parameter
space representing m,ω, φ and tc. A heuristic search implementing the Taboo
algorithm [15] is used to find 10 initial estimates of the parameters which are
then passed to a Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm [16, 17] to minimize the
residuals (the sum of the squares of the differences) between the model and
the data. The bounds of the search space are:
m ∈ [0.001, 1.999] (5)
ω ∈ [0.01, 40] (6)
φ ∈ [0.001, 2pi − 0.001] (7)
tc ∈ [t2, t2 + 0.375(t2 − t1)] (8)
Fig.1 shows the fitting results with a fixed end of the time series t2 = 3
February 2008 and the ensemble of t1s as described above. The use of many
fits provides an ensemble of tc’s, from which we can calculate quantiles of
the most likely date of a crash. The 20%-80% quantile region is shown on
the figure as the inner vertical band with diagonal cross-hatching. The 5%-
95% quantiles are shown as the outer vertical band with horizontal hatching.
The dark vertical line to the left of the quantile windows represent the last
observation used in the analysis, that is, t2. The shaded envelopes to the right
of t2 represent 20%-80% and 5%-95% quantiles of the extrapolations of the
fits. From the plot, we see that both the tc quantiles and the extrapolation
quantiles are consistent with the observed trajectory of the moving average
of the repos market size.
Our use of 7 values of t2’s in the 6 week window described above is to
address the issue of the stability of the predicted crash time in relation to t2.
We fit the ensemble of (t1, t2) intervals as described above and plot the pdf’s
of the predicted crash time tc for each t2. The result is shown in Fig. 2. From
the plot, one can observe two regimes. The first four pdf’s corresponding to
the earliest t2’s peak practically at the same value, showing a very good
stability. The last two pdf’s show a tendency to shift to the future, as
some of the used data starts to be sensitive to the plateauing of the repos
volume. Overall, the observed stability of the predicted distributions of tc’s
means the calibration of the JLS model is quite insensitive with when the
prediction is made. This is proposed as an important validation step for
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Figure 1: Results of the calibration of the JLS model calibrated to the time evolution of
the total repos market size. The end time of the time series is fixed to t2 =2008-02-03,
shown as the dark vertical line to the left of the quantile windows. For different starting
time, the probability density of the crash time tc is shown in quantiles. The curves on the
right of the dark vertical line are the extrapolated quantile repos volume, which are found
consistent with the realized trajectory of the moving average of the repos market size.
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the relevance of the JLS model. This suggests that the JLS model can be
used for advance diagnostic of impending crashes. The present results add
to those accumulating within the “financial bubble experiment”, which has
the goal of constructing advanced forecasts of bubbles and crashes. In the
financial bubble experiment, the results are revealed only after the predicted
event has passed but the original date when we produced the forecasts has
been publicly, digitally authenticated [18, 19].
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Figure 2: We vary the end of the window t2 within the grey area and show the probability
density of the crash time tc for each of these t2, as the bell-shaped curves with open circle
symbols.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed how leverage can influence the liquidity of
the market and used the observation that a dramatic decrease of leverage
coincides with the recent financial crisis. The market size of repos is a very
good proxy for the overall leverage of the market. We used the JLS model
of log-periodic power law dynamics on an ensemble of intervals from a time
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series of the total repos market size and found that the range of crash times
tc as forecast by the fits is consistent with the observed peak and subsequent
crash.
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